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ON STALNAKER’S INDICATIVE
CONDITIONALS
Fabrizio Cariani
Stalnaker’s Indicative Conditionals (1975, henceforth ic) is not primarily
about conditionals. I would call this a “secret” if Stalnaker didn’t go to
some lengths to tell us himself, emphasizing that the essay’s main goal is
to showcase the power of a general-purpose theoretical framework and
not to solve isolated puzzles in conditional semantics (ic, §VI). My aim
is to introduce the central cogs, the main innovations and the general
significance of that framework. Since ic does lead with a puzzle about
indicative conditionals, that’s what I’ll do as well. §1-2 reconstruct the
puzzle and Stalnaker’s solution; §§3-5 develop three research themes
that emerge out of ic. My focus throughout will be on unpacking Stal-
naker’s views and working through some of the unfinished agenda of
ic.1
1 The core puzzle
1.1 Background
ic stages a competition between two analyses of conditional (if...then...)
sentences. Some notation first: I use the two-place connective ‘I’ to
symbolize our target—the conditional construction. The two connectives
we will consider should be thought of as possible candidates for the
meaning of ‘I’. I use ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ as variables ranging over sentences.
The material conditional A ⊃ C is true at world w iff either A is false
at w or C is true at w. According to the material analysis, the material
conditional is the correct semantic value for ‘I’.
1For that reason, I will not survey the whole debate in which it fits. For broader
surveys, see Gillies (2012, forthcoming).
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The selectional conditional A > C is true at world w iff C is true at
the world v that is the closest A-world to w.2 According to the selectional
analysis, the selectional conditional is the correct semantic value for ‘I’
(Stalnaker, 1968; Stalnaker and Thomason, 1970). I call it ‘selectional’
because the model theory for a conditional language including ‘>’ is
often presented in terms of a “selection function” sel that inputs a
proposition p and an evaluation-world w and outputs the selected world
in p from w’s perspective. Famously Stalnaker thinks that selection is
grounded in facts about similarity between worlds. For that reason, he
supplements the selectional analysis with restrictions on closeness, and
so on selection functions.
The theoretical task is to incorporate one of these analyses, the
material or the selectional, in a theory that accurately predicts which
inferences involving conditionals are ordinarily judged valid by speakers
of a language like English.
1.2 The puzzle
Minimal assumptions about the logic of if make it equivalent to the
material conditional. "Collapse", as we call it, happens if AIC and the
corresponding material conditional A⊃C are co-entailing. Using ‘|−’ to
denote entailment, we can write this as follows:
collapse. A I C | − A ⊃ C
The left-to-right direction of collapse follows from modus ponens (and
little else).3
modus ponens. AI C,A |− C
Stalnaker’s focus is on the right-to-left entailment. All it takes to derive
this is the plausible claim that sentences like either Ada was guilty or
2This demands the existence and uniquess of a closest world. An important debate
thread in conditional semantics has focused on these demands. See Lewis (1973);
Stalnaker’s replies are in his (1981) and (1984, ch.7).
3The literature features many interesting attempts to invalidate modus ponens
(McGee, 1985; Lycan, 1993; Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010). Moreover, as Khoo (2013)
makes clear, Kratzer’s semantics for conditionals (Kratzer, 1991, 2012) also invalidates
modus ponens. These should not be dismissed, but they aren’t ways of avoiding
collapse results because attempts to invalidate modus ponens do not usually extend to
bare conditionals. That is, they do not extend to conditionals whose antecedents and
consequences are not modal sentences, like if Ada is innocent, Carmen is guilty. A form
of collapse that is restricted to bare conditionals is no better than general collapse.
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Carmen was entail sentences like if Ada wasn’t guilty, Carmen was. In
schematic form:4
or-to-if. A∨C |− ¬AIC.5
To see this, suppose A ⊃ C; by truth-functional equivalence, we get
(¬A∨C); but if the direct argument is valid, AIC follows (assuming
double-negation elimination).
Perhaps the argument for collapse is an invitation to start loving
the material analysis.6 But, Stalnaker argues, that isn’t such a great
path either. If if were the material conditional, then negating If Ada is
not guilty, then Carmen is guilty should entail Ada is guilty. That seems
wrong: one may negate AI C by way of putting forward some alternative
conditional A I B, without settling the status of A. For instance, one
may negate If Ada is not guilty, then Carmen is, by putting forward If
Ada is not guilty, then Barbara, but not Carmen, is guilty, while leaving
it open whether Ada is guilty. After all, allowing for these kinds of
hypothetical disagreements appears to be precisely what conditionals
are for.7 Formally, we want:
negated conditionals. ¬(AI C) 6|− A
Unfortunately, the material analysis cannot fulfill that wish.
That’s the puzzle: if you like modus ponens, and or-to-if, you will
quickly get collapse. But collapse is bad, among other things because
it violates the negated conditionals desideratum.
A subtler, modern take on this puzzle (Gillies, 2004, 2009) accepts
collapse but rejects the material analysis. According to this view, the
conditional might well be co-entailing with the material conditional
but co-entailment does not suffice for identity of meaning. In fact,
it might not even suffice for logical equivalence—depending on how
logical equivalence is understood. This view does not appear to be on
ic’s radar—and indeed, ic’s theoretical development is a key step on the
path that leads to it. For this reason, I mention it here out of duty to the
fuller dialectic but I will refrain from developing it further.
4Stalnaker calls this “the direct argument”; the ‘or-to-if’ nomenclature comes, I
believe from Bennett 2003.
5Adams (1975, p.15) gives an example that purports to show or-to-if to be prob-
abilistically invalid. What he means by this is that there are cases in which A∨C has
high probability while ¬AI C has low probability.
6Possibly supplemented by implicature-based moves in the style of Grice 1989;
Lewis 1976; Jackson 1987.
7See Edgington (1995) for a comprehensive array of nails in the material condi-
tional’s coffin.
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The only other option is to reject the validity of or-to-if. This is
what happens with ‘>’. Of course, we didn’t need the collapse result to
know that or-to-if fails for ‘>’. It is easy to sketch a counterexample.
Suppose that in the actual world (w) Ada alone is guilty (A), but in the
closest world in which she is innocent (v), Bo is guilty (B) and Carmen is
not (C).
ABC
w
ABC
v
ABC
z
Then ¬A > C is false at w even if A ∨ C is true there. The additional
value of the collapse result is the implication that invalidating or-to-if
is required to avoid co-entailment with the material conditional.
Here, then, is ic’s local puzzle: how might we invalidate or-to-if
while accounting for its plausibility?
2 Stalnaker’s solution
Stalnaker solution is that or-to-if, though invalid, is pragmatically
acceptable. Spelling this out is a two-part task. The first step is to
explain how an inference pattern might be acceptable even if invalid. To
this end, Stalnaker develops the concept of "reasonable inference". Then,
one must check that instances of or-to-if count as reasonable inferences.
The explicit inspiration is Grice’s pragmatic defense of the material
analysis (Grice, 1989, ch. 4). Like Grice, Stalnaker proposes that much
of the inferential profile of the conditional comes from features that are
not determined by its truth-conditions. One difference is that, while
Grice primarily applies the theory of implicatures to prune off some
unwanted entailments of the material conditional, Stalnaker’s central
concern is that the selectional conditional undergenerates the acceptable
inference patterns. Moreover, the patterns it misses are not rescued by
the theory of implicatures.
There are important novel elements in Stalnaker’s approach. I men-
tion three. One: Stalnaker’s system relies on constraints tied to the use of
specific lexical items in context (see below for illustration). By contrast,
the theory of conversational implicatures (at least, in vintage-Grice ver-
sion) only leverages general principles about rationality and cooperation
between conversational participants. Two: the acceptability of some
reasonable inferences depends on relationships between the information
conveyed and the common ground. Three: the account appeals to prag-
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matic principles that are themselves formalizable. Indeed, the appendix
to ic goes to some lengths to state the pragmatic theory formally.
2.1 Introducing Reasonable Inference
It is worth quoting Stalnaker’s characterization of reasonable inference
in full. More recent appeals to ic’s playbook often rely on simplified
notions that have different structural properties from the original.8
[A]n inference from a sequence of assertions or suppositions
(the premisses) to a conclusion is a reasonable inference just
in case in every context in which the premises can be as-
serted or supposed, it is impossible for anyone to accept the
premises without committing himself to the conclusion. (ic ,
p. 271)
Let us break down the main technical concepts in this definition with
an eye towards coming up with an algorithm for testing reasonableness.
Context: A Stalnakerian context is a record of those propositions that
are commonly accepted by the participants to a conversation. Stal-
naker’s thinking on the nature of context is complex and evolves over
four decades (Stalnaker, 1974, 1978, 2002, 2016). One thing that stays
constant is the idea that each context c is associated with a set of possible
worlds—the context set of c. In particular, the context set of c is the set of
worlds that verify each of the propositions that are common ground in c.
Since the context set is the only feature of context we need to attend to, I
will deliberately conflate contexts and their context sets.
Commitment and context acceptance: It is somewhat surprising to see
Stalnaker talk about speakers’ commitments. However, the technical
appendix to ic reveals that talk of speaker’s commitment is just short-
hand for talk about the shared elements of context. The possible world
8For example, reasonable inference is sometimes lumped together with the rela-
tion of “quasi-validity” (see e.g. Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010, fn. 39). An argu-
ment is quasi-valid if, whenever the premises are known, the conclusion must also be
known. Quasi-validity might function in some similar respect like reasonable infer-
enece (Nolan, 2003, p. 231), but it is significantly different in concept and mechanics.
The closest ancestor to quasi-validity is the concept of "doxastic indefensibility" devel-
oped by Hintikka (1962) to account for Moore’s paradox. Other nearby notions that are
often associated with reasonable inference are Veltman’s (1996, p.224) validity2 (aka
update-to-test, in the terminology of van Benthem 1996 and Gillies 2004) and validity3
(aka test-to-test, or also informational consequence in the terminology of Yalcin 2007).
Finally, the distinction between preservation of truth and preservation of acceptance
also shows up in the debate surrounding McGee’s counterexamples to modus ponens
(see for example, McGee, 1985, p.90).
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framework Stalnaker adopts allows definitions that clarify the relevant
cluster of concepts.
unstructured contents. |A| = {w |A is true at w}
context acceptance. c accepts A iff c ⊆ |A|.9
context incompatibility. c is incompatible with A iff c∩ |A| = ∅
A successful assertive utterance of A in c updates c to cA = c∩ |A|. To say
that a speaker who assertively utters A in c is committed to some other
proposition p is just to say that cA ⊆ p.
Assertibility. The definition of reasonable inference quantifies over con-
texts in which the premises can be asserted (or supposed). To understand
this restriction, note that in the background of ic is the idea that assertive
utterances come with requirements that the context must meet—as we
may call them, presuppositions. Some (though not all) of these require-
ments are specifically tied to the use of particular lexical items. One
cannot assertively utter Raz returned to Valencia in a context that doesn’t
that Raz ever was in Valencia. Stalnaker’s account of or-to-if essen-
tially references the constraints imposed on context by conditionals and
disjunctions.
The reasonable inference test. Let’s put this all together. To check
whether C is a reasonable inference from premises A1, ...,An.
• consider an arbitrary context c in which all the premises are assert-
ible.
• let c′ be the context that results from asserting all of the premises
in sequence.
• the inference is reasonable if and only if c′ accepts C.
2.2 Stalnaker’s explanation at a glance
It is useful to break down Stalnaker’s account of or-to-if into two
modules—a general module and one for card-carrying Stalnakerians.
The general module, which I introduce in this section, does not pre-
suppose the possible-worlds framework. It only presupposes that there
is some way of cashing out the relevant concepts of compatibility and
acceptance, such that the following principles are satisfied:
9In ic, context acceptance is a relation between a context and a set of worlds. For
exposition purposes, I prefer to define it as a relation between contexts and sentences
(but one that treats any two sentences that have the same unstructured content in the
same way).
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d-constraint. A∨C is assertible in c only if c is compatible with ¬A & C
and c is compatible with A & ¬C.
d-update. Successful assertive utterance of A ∨ C in c updates c to a
context that is:
• incompatible with ¬A & ¬C.
• compatible with ¬A & C if c was.
c-acceptance. If c is incompatible with ¬A & ¬C and c is compatible
with ¬A & C, then c accepts ¬AI C.
d-constraint is justified on familiar Gricean grounds. d-update is a
direct consequence of the account of assertive update I sketched in
§2.1 according to which c′ = c∩ |A∨C|. As for c-acceptance, it might
be defended in a variety of ways, depending on one’s semantics for
conditionals. I introduce Stalnaker’s defense of c-acceptance for §2.3.
For now, let us check that this is enough to classify or-to-if as a
reasonable inference.
1. Let c be an arbitrary context in which A∨C is assertible.
2. By d-constraint, c must be compatible with ¬A & C.
3. Let c′ be the result of updating c with the assertion of A∨C.
4. By d-update and 2., c′ is incompatible with ¬A & ¬C but compati-
ble with ¬A & C.
5. By c-acceptance and 4., c′ must accept AI C.
2.3 Inside Stalnaker’s box
I postponed the defense of c-acceptance. Here it is, in Stalnaker’s words:
pragmatic constraint. If the conditional is being evaluated at a world
in the context set, then the world selected must, if possible, be
within the context set as well. [...] In other words, all worlds
within the context set are closer to each other than any worlds
outside it. (ic, pp. 275-276)
The formal upshot is that selection functions must satisfy the following
constraint (where sel denotes the selection function itself):10
10Stalnaker gives a different condition—namely: ∀w ∈ c, sel(A,w) ∈ c. This condition
does not match the informal presentation of the constraint. However, the condition
8 ON STALNAKER’S INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS
∀w ∈ c and z < c, sel(w,A) = z only if c∩ |A| = ∅
In turn, this constraint is justified as follows:
Normally a speaker is concerned only with possible worlds
within the context set, since this set is defined as the set of
possible worlds among which the speaker wishes to distin-
guish. So it is at least a normal expectation that the selection
function should turn first to these worlds before considering
counterfactual worlds — those presupposed to be non-actual.
(ic, pp. 276)
Some comments in bullet-point format:
• c-acceptance only holds by default, or in normal circumstances.
This should draw our attention to those cases in which this default
presumption is suspended. For instance, Stalnaker remarks that it
is suspended by subjunctive conditionals, like if I had a house, it
would not have a front-yard. (ic, p. 276-277).
• The pragmatic constraint breaks the visual analogy between spatial
distance and modal similarity. Consider:
w1
w2 w3 w4 w5
c
In this depiction, w2 is spatially closer to w1 than it is to w5. But
because both belong to the context set c, w2 and w5 must be more
similar to each other than w2 is to w1. It should be immediately
apparent that this is no accident of the depiction: given any depic-
tion of logical space as a convex set, worlds in c can be chosen that
are arbitrarily close (spatially) to worlds outside c. Of course, there
are ways to depict the structure of logical space that is imposed by
the pragmatic constraint, especially if the depiction is allowed to
include points that do not correspond to worlds.
does follow from a strengthening of the pragmatic constraint which I am about to
discuss.
Another thing to consider is whether this stronger condition might be weakened
by appealing to accessibility relations. While ic’s formalism is a notch looser than
Stalnaker (1968) and Stalnaker and Thomason (1970), both these earlier works in-
volve an accessibility relation. In a recent paper, Mandelkern (2018) proposes a role
for accessibility relation that bears directly on the formal analysis of the pragmatic
constraint.
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Pictorial musings aside, there is a broader theoretical point. If we
try to supplement Stalnaker’s proposal with a theory of context-
dynamics, the pragmatic constraint will require that every (non-
empty) informational update to the context must also rearrange
the ordering of modal similarity.
Moving back to the main argumentative thread, Stalnaker uses the
pragmatic constraint to support:
antecedent compatibility. AI C presupposes that A is compatible with
the context set (ic, p. 277).
This idea has been influential and it is sometimes simply quoted in
place of the original constraint. However, it is clear that pragmatic
constraint does not entail antecedent compatibility. The former, but
not the latter, is trivially satisfied if there are no antecedent worlds in
the context set. ic’s text strongly suggests that what fills the gap between
pragmatic constraint and antecedent compatibility is the availability
of the subjunctive conditional as a tool to talk about worlds out of the
context set (more on this in the next section). However, it is unclear
exactly what principles are relied on in this derivation.
Be all that as it may, the pragmatic constraint is enough for the job
at hand.
Fact 1 Given the framework, pragmatic constraint entails c-acceptance
Proof: See appendix for proof of this and other facts.
That completes the official path to a pragmatic explanation of or-to-
if. There are, of course, other paths that leverage other theories of
the conditional. As an illustration, let ‘→’ denote a strict conditional
restricted to the context set. That is, say that A→ C is true at w and
context c iff c is incompatible with A & ¬C. Then:
Fact 2 If entailment is defined as preservation of truth at a world and a
context, A∨C 6|− ¬A→ C.
Fact 3 However,→ satisfies c-acceptance.
Given Fact 3, or-to-if for→ can too be rescued as a reasonable inference.
I don’t mean to take this point very far, but it does show that the main
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strategy of ic is not exclusively available to defenders of the selectional
analysis.
3 Interlude: indicative vs. subjunctive conditionals
It is a remarkable feature of Indicative Conditionals that one of its di-
gressions opened its own research thread. The digression in question
concerns the distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals.
There are many important contrasts between indicatives and subjunc-
tives. The central contrast in ic’s dialectic is that indicatives and sub-
junctives pattern differently with respect to information that is settled
by the common ground. Contrast:
(1) #Ada is guilty. If she isn’t, Carmen is.
(2) Ada is guilty. If she weren’t, Carmen would be.
There is an incongruence in (1), as if the speaker is changing their mind
or hedging their assertion. No such incongruence affects (2).
One might account for contrasts like this by distinguishing two
kinds of conditional connectives. According to this view, (1) uses "the
indicative conditional" and the (2) uses "the subjunctive conditional".
Stalnaker would have us avoid this approach. According to him,
we can hold on to a single meaning for if, while also explaining how
indicative and subjunctive conditional sentences diverge in meaning.
From a pragmatic point of view, Stalnaker thinks that subjunctives are
not subject to either version of the pragmatic constraint. Interestingly,
this pragmatic suggestion has a syntactic basis. The syntactic proposal is
that subjunctive conditionals feature one ingredient that is not present
in indicatives: subjunctive mood. Here is how a toy, ic-inspired syntax
for (2) might go. Let s-mood be a sentential operator that captures the
effect of subjunctive mood.
(3) s-mood(Ada is not guilty) > would(Carmen is)
Many authors have since questioned the link between "subjunctive
mood" and counterfactuality. The alternative view (Dudman, 1983,
1984; Lycan, 2001; Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2013; Starr, 2014; Khoo,
2015) is that "subjunctivity" comes from an extra layer of past tense on
the antecedent. What is special about this extra layer is that it does not
appear (at least on the surface) to get a past interpretation.11 As Iatridou
11There is a further debate, including among the authors I cited, as to whether the
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notes, this is especially salient when "fake past tense" is restricted by
future adverbials, as in:
(4) If Odysseus returned tomorrow, his dog would recognize him.
Despite this, the right perspective on the legacy of ic should be that,
though it might have gotten the syntactic details wrong, it helped ad-
vance the powerful idea that subjunctive meaning ought to be con-
structed out of the syntactic ingredients of subjunctive conditionals.12
The other key component of ic’s account of the contrast is the idea
that there are pragmatic differences between indicatives and subjunc-
tives. As I mentioned, the proposal is that subjunctive conditionals are
not subject to the pragmatic constraint. But how is that supposed to
work, given that we have already rejected the idea that if is ambiguous?
Stalnaker sketches an interesting proposal:
I take it that the subjunctive mood in English and some
other languages is a conventional device for indicating that
presuppositions are being suspended, which means in the
case of subjunctive conditional statements, that the selection
function is one that may reach outside of the context set. (p.
276)
This is how I read this: the pragmatic constraint is a presupposition
introduced by if.13 However, it can be lifted by other devices. Stalnaker’s
idea seems to be that, while presuppositions are requirements on context,
some phrases may suspend those requirements (in other words: introduce
permissions). I find this idea fascinating, interestingly counter to the
current orthodoxy, and deserving of careful development. As far as I
know, it hasn’t received one.
It is natural to see this lack of development as a significant lacuna.
For instance, Starr writes:
Why [...] did Stalnaker not propose a meaning for the sub-
junctive mood and construe the different propositions ex-
pressed by subjunctive and indicative conditionals as a func-
tion of this mood’s contribution? (Starr, 2014, p. 1031)
modal force of subjunctive conditionals might be recovered by giving that past tense
an ordinary past interpretation.
12It should be mentioned that a critical step in this path was the application of
Kratzer’s (1991; 2012) framework to conditionals.
13This might need to be massaged a bit in light of the fact that Stalnaker is skeptical
about the idea of semantic presupposition, Stalnaker 1974). But I don’t see a way of
reading the text of ic without linking the presupposition to this lexical item.
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I think that Starr is exactly right. It is not enough to point to an extra
syntactic constituent, be it mood or tense, and claim that it might do the
job. Much of the best contemporary work on the indicative/subjunctive
contrast (including that of the authors I mentioned in this section) is
precisely directed at developing a compositional account. Additionally,
Starr (2014, p.1030) identifies some technical issues with Stalnaker’s
approach to the indicative/subjunctive contrast which are well worth
working through—though space prevents me from doing that here.
4 On the intransitivity of reasonable inference
Arguably, the most important contribution of ic is the introduction of
the concept of reasonable inference. Earlier, I have noted three inno-
vations: (i) that reasonable inference involves formalizable principles,
(ii) that it is anchored by non-truth-conditional features of the meaning
of particular lexical items, and (iii) that it involves relations between
utterances of conditional sentences and the common ground. In light
of these innovations, it is natural to view the concept of reasonable in-
ference as a critical step on the path to dynamic notions of consequence
(á-la Veltman 1996).
But it would be hasty to assimilate Stalnaker’s notion of reasonable
inference and the dynamic concepts of consequence. Stalnaker himself
has recently emphasized some differences between the dynamic seman-
tics program and his preferred “dynamic pragmatics” (Stalnaker, 2016).
Here, I want to emphasize some under-explored structural features of
reasonable inference. In particular, I will focus on the little-known-but-
obvious-once-you-see-it fact that reasonable inference is intransitive.14
I argue that the intransitivity of reasonable inference might come with
some explanatory benefits. However, I will also question whether Stal-
naker is in a position to reap those benefits, given some of the other
commitments he undertakes in ic. More than anything else, my aim is
to stress that there are under-explored choice-points in developing the
theory of reasonable-inference.
Let us use ‘’ to symbolize the reasonable inference relation and
restate its definition:
A1, ...,An  C if and only if for all contexts c, if all of the Ai
are assertible in c and c′ is the result of asserting all of the
Ai ’s in sequence, c′ accepts C.
14I learned this from Simon Goldstein and I have not found the issue discussed
elsewhere.
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Here are some important facts concerning . First, every semantically
valid argument is a reasonable inference.
Fact 4 if Σ |= C then Σ C
Second, the inference from a sentence to its presuppositions is always
reasonable.
Fact 5 if A presupposes C, then A C
Given these facts, it is easy to check that  is intransitive in the
following sense.
Fact 6 (intransitivity) Let Σ be a set of sentences. Σ  B and B  C do
not guarantee Σ C
In establishing this, it is convenient (but, as I will show shortly, not
essential) to add to the formal language a possibility operator ♦ that
tracks what is compatible with the context set. So, ♦A is true at w in c iff
c∩ |A| , ∅.
By d-constraint a disjunction A∨C is only assertible in those
contexts that are compatible with ¬A & C. In particular,
A∨¬A requires that c be compatible with ¬A & ¬A. Though
I have defined compatibility as a relation between contexts
and sentences, the relation treats intensionally equivalent
sentences in the same way. In other words, compatibility
with ¬A & ¬A reduces to compatibility with ¬A. Using our
new possibility operator, we say that A∨¬A presupposes ♦¬A.
Thus, by Fact 5,
A∨¬A ♦¬A
However, A∨¬A is a logical truth; given Fact 4, it can be rea-
sonably inferred from the empty set of premises (i.e. every
context accepts it). By contrast, ♦¬A cannot be reasonably in-
ferred from the empty set of premises. Putting it all together:
 A∨¬A
A∨¬A ♦¬A
6 ♦¬A

14 ON STALNAKER’S INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS
Though this fact is surprising, there is nothing intrinsically problematic
about it. Reasonable inference is a technical concept that is invoked to
play a certain role—to characterize the acceptable patterns of inference.
There is no a-priori reason why that job should be best played by a
transitive notion.
Still, we may ask whether intransitivity is indispensable to Stal-
naker’s explanation. A useful first experiment in this direction is to
compare  with its transitive closure. Define + as the smallest transi-
tive relation that extends . Since + extends , it classifies or-to-if as
acceptable. More generally, any empirical comparison between  and
+ must be based on inferences that are sanctioned as acceptable by +
but not by .
This comparison reveals some unique advantages of . One of the
advantages of Stalnaker’s theory is that it doesn’t validate the paradoxes
of material implication. The theory invalidates both these patterns:
false antecedent. ¬A |− A > C
true consequent. C |− A > C
Not only are these patterns invalid, they are also not reasonable, in the
sense of . However, both are sanctioned as acceptable by +. We can
see this by noting another violation of transitivity for :
Fact 7
(i) ¬A ¬A∨C
(ii) ¬A∨C A > C but
(iii) ¬A 6 A > C
I give this proof in the main text because it illustrates some of the critical
elements I have been drawing attention to.
(i) follows from Fact 4. (ii) is the reasonable-inference ana-
logue of or-to-if for ‘>’. As for (iii), let c be a context in
which ¬A’s presuppositions are satisfied and also such that
all the A-worlds are ¬C-worlds. Consider some arbitrary
world w ∈ c¬A. To evaluate A > C at w we must reach out of
c¬A. We do know however that all the A-worlds outside of c¬A
are ¬C-worlds, so sel(A,w) < |C|, which must mean that A > C
is false at w. Note that pragmatic constraint is vacuously
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satisfied in c¬A, since there are no A-worlds to select. Fur-
thermore, antecedent compatibility is violated. However,
neither of these is incompatible with (iii). 
By contrast, because + is transitive and extends , (i) and (ii) force
A+ A > C.
Many theorists accept the validity of false antecedent and true
consequent as the cost of doing business. But the intransitive Stalnake-
rian package undoubtedly maps onto clear intuitions. Consider:
(5) Ada is not guilty
(6) Either Ada is not guilty or Carmen is guilty
(7) If Ada is guilty, Carmen is guilty
The intransitive package predicts that:
• the inference from (5) to (6) is reasonable
• the inference from (6) to (7) is also reasonable
• the inference from (5) to (7) is not reasonable.
These predictions seem just right and a system relying on intransitive
notions is uniquely positioned to capture them.15 None of this is a
conclusive argument for Stalnaker’s intransitive package. Any such
argument would require a much more systematic analysis than what I
can offer here. But it does mean that the intransitive package shows up
to the jury of theory-choice criteria with a unique profile.
That is all good, but there is one more twist. The official story of ic
is a bit more complicated than the story I just told. We can see this by
attending to Stalnaker’s discussion of the contraposition pattern.
contraposition. A > C |− ¬C > ¬A
Like or-to-if, contraposition sounds plausible in the indicative case but
not in the subjunctive case (Stalnaker 1968, p. 107; Lewis 1973, §1.8).
Once again, Stalnaker proposes to invalidate the general pattern, while
explaining the plausible cases via reasonable inference. Unfortunately,
this strategy doesn’t work.
15For some related technical work involving an intransitive notion of entailment,
see Cariani and Goldstein (forthcoming).
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Fact 8 The reasonable-inference analogue of contraposition fails. (i.e.
A > C 6 ¬C > ¬A).
Stalnaker suggests a patch:
Strictly, [contraposition] is reasonable only relative to the
further assumption that the indicative conclusion is not in-
appropriate" (Stalnaker, 1975, note 15)
What could it mean that an inference pattern is reasonable relative to a
further assumption?
One possibility is that there isn’t one, monolithic notion of reason-
able inference, but a family of them. In addition to , we ought to
consider what I’ll call Strawsonian Reasonable Inference.
A1, ...,An S C if and only if for all contexts c, if all of the
Ai are assertible in c and c′ is the result of asserting all of
the Ai ’s, if C is assertible in c′, then c′ accepts the proposition
corresponding to C.
This is just like reasonable inference, except for the underlined bit.
Moreover, just like reasonable inference S is intransitive (it is easy to
check that the instance of intransitivity I sketched in establishing Fact 6
also works for S). In essence S is a pragmaticized version of Strawson
Entailment.16 Since S extends , we can update the Stalnakerian
proposal to the claim the acceptable arguments are exactly the ones that
are captured by S .
So, does this Strawsonized package catch contraposition, as Stal-
naker claims? It depends.
Fact 9 If the presupposition of indicatives is antecedent compatibility,
then contraposition, true consequent and false antecedent are all
Strawsonian Reasonable Inferences.
Fact 10 If the presupposition is just the pragmatic constraint, then none
of contraposition, true consequent and false antecedent count as
Strawsonian Reasonable Inferences.
16In a trivalent setting (e.g. in the context of a semantic account of presupposition),
Strawson Entailment is equivalent to the claim that valid arguments are exactly those
that cannot have true premises and false conclusions. (If this sounds like classical
entailment, recall that in the trivalent setting the "standard" notions of consequence
are preservation of truth and preservation of non-falsehood.) For discussion: Strawson
(1952); Smiley (1967); von Fintel (1997); Cariani and Goldstein (forthcoming).
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Two things are interesting here. One: there is a tradeoff between in-
validating the paradoxes of material implication and classifying con-
traposition as acceptable. So it is not clear that Stalnaker can exploit
the intransitivity of reasonable inference to avoid the paradoxes of ma-
terial implication. Two: if we prioritize catching the contraposition
pattern, we need the full force of antecedent compatibility. This is
unlike or-to-if for which pragmatic constraint is enough.
5 On Fatalism
The word limit for this essay is nearing, and I must catch up with Stal-
naker application of ic’s apparatus to the "idle" argument for fatalism
(see also Dummett, 1964). Extra motivation here is provided by the
recent publication of the contemporary gold standard on the idle argu-
ment (Bledin, forthcoming), and by the fact that the idle argument is
closely connected with the much-discussed miners paradox.17 Consider:
(1) Either this essay will be mistake-ridden or it will not be.
(2) | Suppose it will be.
(3) | If I am careful, the essay will be mistake-ridden.
(4) | Being careful is ineffective.
(5) | Suppose it will not be.
(6) | If I am not careful, the essay will not be mistake-ridden.
(7) | Being careful is unnecessary.
(8) Being careful is either ineffective or unnecessary.
A satisfactory diagnosis of the idle argument ought to identify where
it fails and explain why each step appears compelling. Here are the
highlights of Stalnaker’s account:
• The steps (2) ⇒ (3) and (5) ⇒ (6) are invalid, since they are in-
stances of true consequent.
• The inferences corresponding to each of these steps might be
"saved" pragmatically by appealing to Strawsonized Reasonable
Inference.
• The application of constructive dilemma (or "reasoning by cases")
in step (8) is not justified as a reasonable inference. That is:
A C,B C does not guarantee A∨B C,
17Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010); Charlow (2013); Cariani et al. (2013); Willer
(2012); Cariani (2016).
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• Despite this, the last step appears compelling because constructive
dilemma is valid when the subarguments are valid.
The aggregated effect is that the premises of the argument do not entail
its conclusion, nor is it possible to support the conclusion as a reasonable
inference from the premises. However, the conclusion appears plausible
because each step is justifiable by at least one of these relations.
This dialectic is subtle and needs some unpacking. First, we need
to clarify the claims about the constructive dilemma pattern. Contrast:
cd. if A |− C and B |− C, A∨B |− C,
rcd. if A C and B C, then A∨B C
The key observation is that while cd states a true claim about the logic,
rcd does not. Although every entailment is a reasonable inference, it
is not the case that, for every true claim about entailment, there is a
corresponding true claim about reasonable inference.
Consider this analogy. The relationship between the concept of
entailment and the concept of reasonable inference is, in the relevant
sense, like the relationship between the concept of being a Roman and
the concept of being Italian: instances of the former are guaranteed
to be instances of the latter. That does not mean that for every true
claim about Romans there is a true claim about Italians. This could fail
in particular if the concept appears in the antecedent of a conditional
(much like |− and  do in cd and rcd respectively). For example, if Joe is
a Roman, Joe lives within driving distance of the beach does not entail if Joe
is Italian, Joe lives within driving distance of the beach.
The observation that constructive dilemma behaves in this unusual
way for some non-classical consequence relations that extend classical
validity is important and it reappears in different guises in much of the
contemporary discussion of information-sensitive modals.18
Another noteworthy item—our final one—is that the dialectic I
spelled out at the end of §4 resurfaces here. The steps (2)⇒ (3) and
(5)⇒ (6) both have the form of true consequent. As we know, true
consequent is not a reasonable inference. Stalnaker acknowledges this
(fn. 17) and claims that the steps are reasonable in the Strawsonian sense
(i.e. according to S). As we know from Facts 9-10 this is only true
if we stipulate antecedent compatibility. In fact, ic’s account of the
18Some key references for the discussion of constructive dilemma in, and around,
dynamic semantics: Veltman (1996); Yalcin (2012); Willer (2012); Bledin (2014, 2015,
forthcoming); Marra (2014); Moss (2015); Charlow (ms.); Goldstein (ms.).
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idle argument requires this particular combination (S and antecedent
compatibility). Given the essential role of that combination in capturing
contraposition we likely should characterize it as the "official" version
of ic’s pragmatics.
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Appendix
Fact 1 Given the framework, pragmatic constraint entails c-acceptance
Proof: Suppose that c is incompatible with ¬A & ¬C and c
is compatible with ¬A & C. Now consider any world w in
c. We must show that the closest ¬A-world to w is a C-world.
By the pragmatic constraint, the ¬A & C-world v that is in
the context set must be closer to w than any ¬A & ¬C world.
Now, because Stalnaker’s selection functions are grounded
by an ordering of similarity, the closest A-world is either the
closest ¬A & C-world or the closest ¬A & ¬C-world. But it
cannot be the latter, so it must be the closest ¬A & C-world.

Fact 2 If entailment is defined as preservation of truth at a world and a
context, A∨C 6|− ¬A→ C.
Fix c and w so that A∨C is true at w and c but also so that
the context c contains some ¬A & ¬C-world. (Note that I
assume that disjunction is Boolean in the sense that the truth-
conditions of A∨C at w and c only depend on w.) So c is not
incompatible with ¬A & ¬C, which would make ¬A→ C
false. 
Fact 3 However,→ satisfies c-acceptance.
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Fix c and w. Suppose (i) c∩|¬A|∩|¬C| = ∅ and (ii) c∩|¬A|∩|C| ,
∅. Note that (i) aloneis enough to guarantee ¬A→ C at every
world within c which is what needed to be shown. 
Fact 4 if Σ |= C then Σ C
Fix a c in which every member of Σ is assertible. Let cΣ be the
context resulting from the sequential update of c with every
premise in Σ. Let |Σ| denote the set ⋂{|A| |A ∈ Σ} . Because
cΣ ⊆ |Σ| and |Σ| ⊆ |C|, cΣ ⊆ |C|, which is what we need to show
to establish that→ satisfies the analogue of c-acceptance. 
Fact 5 if A presupposes C, then A C
Suppose c is an arbitrary initial context in which A is assert-
ible. Since the assertibility conditions for A include C, we
must have c ⊆ |C|. Since cA ⊆ c, we must have cA ⊆ |C|. 
Fact 6 (intransitivity) Let Σ be a set of sentences. Σ  B and B  C do
not guarantee Σ C.
[proven in the main text]
Fact 7
(i) ¬A ¬A∨C
(ii) ¬A∨C A > C but
(iii) ¬A 6 A > C
[proven in the main text]
Fact 8 The reasonable-inference analogue of contraposition fails. (i.e.
A > C 6 ¬C > ¬A).
This failure can be illustrated along the same lines as the
failure of part (iii) of Fact 7. Let c be a context in which
A > C’s presuppositions are satisfied. Suppose that c only
contains C-worlds, but also that there are some ¬C-worlds
in the background model. Suppose however that all such
¬C-worlds are A-worlds. Let c′ be the result of updating c
with A > C. Now, consider the evaluation of ¬C > ¬A in c′:
since there are no ¬C-worlds in c′, the selection function
must reach outside of it to find some ¬C-worlds. However,
such worlds are A-worlds, so c′ does not accept ¬C > ¬A. 
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Fact 9 If the presupposition of conditionals is antecedent compatibility,
then contraposition, true consequent and false antecedent are all
Strawsonian Reasonable Inferences.
Let c be a context in which A > C’s presuppositions are satis-
fied. Let c′ be the result of updating c with A > C. Because
of Stalnaker’s commitment to strong centering (if w makes
A true, w is the closest A-world to itself), part of the effect of
the update from c to c′ is to rule out all the A & ¬C-worlds.
Now suppose c′ satisfies the presuppositions of ¬C > ¬A.
This must mean that c′ contains a ¬C-world v. But we just
argued that the A & ¬C-worlds have been excluded in the
transition from c to c′. So v must be a ¬A & ¬C-world, and
indeed this must be the case for any ¬C-world in v. Since the
worlds in c′ are to be considered closer than the worlds out
of c′, v (or some world relevantly like it) must be the closest
¬C-world. So the closest ¬C-world is a ¬A-world.
This same argument, however, will go through for true con-
sequent and false antecedent. 
Fact 10 If the presupposition is just pragmatic constraint, then none
of contraposition, true consequent and false antecedent count as
Strawsonian Reasonable Inferences.
The countermodel we constructed in establishing Fact 8 vacu-
ously satisfies pragmatic constraint in the updated context.
(Similarly for analogous countermodels for true consequent
and false antecedent.) 
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